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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTIcLE 10 - PARTIES GENERALLY
CPLR 1005: Court of Appeals liberalizes availability of class actions.
CPLR 1005 authorizes a representative suit "[w]here the question
is one of a common or general interest of many .... "130 Although the
social utility of class suits has long been recognized,' 31 the restrictive
case law development of class action procedure has nonetheless op-
erated as a bar to its employment in the public interest fields.132 While
legislative action would be preferable in reforming class action law,133
the continued efforts of the Judicial Conference to enact proposed
article nine, which would substantially revise class action procedure
to accord with practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
have been unavailing.134 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals has under-
taken the task of liberalization in Ray v. Marine Midland Grace Trust
Co.1 3 5
is reputed for generosity in its judgments. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 316,
234 N.E.2d 669, 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 641 (1967) (Breitel, J., concurring).
130 CPLR 1005(a) provides:
Where the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons or
where the persons who might be made parties are very numerous and it may
be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or
defend for the benefit of all.
Although the use of the disjunctive "or" seems to authorize a class suit in two separate
instances, the practice of the courts has been to construe the provision in the conjunc-
tive. See Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 CoLuM. L. REv. 609
(1971).
131 See generally Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684 (1941); Weinstein, The Class Action is Not Abusive, 167 N.Y.L.J.
84, May 1, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
132 The doctrine of separate wrongs, see notes 143-46 and accompanying text infra,
has consistently precluded the utilization of the class action as a remedy in the fields
of consumer and civil rights. For example, in Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259
N-E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970), a class action was brought to recover the statutory
penalty for illegal credit service charges. Alleging that the contracts the defendant finance
company acquired were illegal in that certain printed parts of the contracts were less
than the required size, the class was comprised of parties who made separate agreements
with different sellers but pursuant to the same written installment form. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the representative action. Adhering to the doctrine of separate wrongs,
the Court held that the mere allegation of identical facts was not sufficient to create a
common right. Id. at 400, 259 N.E.2d at 721, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 282-83.
133 See Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 N.Y.2d 304, 313, 307 N.E.2d 554, 558,
352 N.Y.S.2d 433, 439 (1973), wherein the Court stated:
Because . . . [legislative action] would assure limitations and safeguards which
would be highly desirable in broadening the jurisdiction of the courts of this
State over class actions, legislation in this area is highly preferable to the alter-
native of judicial development ....
134 Article nine of the CPLR has been proposed annually by the Judicial Conference
since 1972. See TwELFrH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLA-
TURE ON THE CPLR, appearing in 2 N.Y. SEss. LAws 1797-1803 (McKinney 1974) [herein-
after cited as TwELTH ANNUAL REPORT]. On January 21, 1975, numerous state senators
and assemblymen reintroduced article nine to the 1975 Legislature. See N.Y.S. 1309,
N.Y.A. 1252, 1975-76 Sess. At present, the outcome of the proposal remains uncertain.
135 35 N.Y.2d 147, 316 N.E.2d 320, 359 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1974).
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In Ray, a representative action was instituted on behalf of owners
of certain debentures against the defendant indenture trustee. The
defendant, charged with breach of trust, gross negligence, and conflict
of interests, moved to dismiss the representative portion of plaintiffs'
complaint. In affirming the order of the Appellate Division, First De-
partment, which had authorized the class suit,13 the Court ostensibly
adopted a liberal posture toward the employment of representative
actions. Recognizing that the class device was a creature of equity, the
Court noted that its development should comport with expanding
equitable considerations. 37
In authorizing the class action, many of the basic criteria adopted
by the Court appear patterned after the liberal statutory framework
of the federal provision 38 and proposed article nine of the CPLR.13 9
These standards include: (1) predomination of common issues of law or
fact; (2) impracticality of joinder; (3) adequate representation; (4) simi-
lar claims among the class; and (5) the preferability of adjudicating the
controversy through the class action device.140 Moreover, in a further
136 Ray v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 41 App. Div. 2d 906, 342 N.YS.2d 641
(Ist Dep't 1973).
137 It would be anomalous to regard the statute, progressive in content, as in-
tended to restrict the scope of equity or to freeze its development. It has, there-
fore, always remained for the courts to give meaning to the remedy, based on
substantive and developing equitable considerations.
35 N.Y.2d at 152, 316 N.E.2d at 323, 359 N.YS.2d at 32.
138 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(3).
139 Section 901 of the proposed article provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all if:
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise
required or permitted, is impracticable;
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predomi-
nate over any questions affecting only individual members;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class;
4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class; and
5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effi-
dent adjudication of the controversy.
TwErLm ANNUAL REPoRT, supra note 134, at 1799.
14035 N.Y.2d at 154-55, 316 N.E.2d at 324, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 33-34.
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the Supreme Court held that
where a class action is based on common questions of law and fact, rule 23(c)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that individual notice of the commencement
of the suit be sent to all reasonably identifiable class members. Because CPLR 1005(b)
does not require such notice, the Court in Ray felt that Eisen would not be relevant to
class action procedure in New York. 35 N.Y.2d at 155, 316 N.E.2d at 325, 359 N.Y.S.2d
at 34. However, a question arises as to whether the Supreme Court's ruling in Eisen is
one of constitutional construction, i.e., whether due process mandates individual notice
to the members of a class whose self-appointed representatives have instituted litigation
of common factual and legal issues. In this respect, the Eisen requirement may be bind-
ing on those class suits which are maintained under the liberal criteria adopted in Ray.
35 N.Y.2d at 156, 316 N.E.2d at 325-26, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 36 (Wachtler, J., concurring).
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stride toward conforming class action procedure with the federal rules
and proposed article nine, the Court expanded the role of the tribunal
in managing class litigation. Though CPLR 1005(b) merely provides
that the court may impose such terms as protect the interests of the
class, 141 the Ray Court ruled that in administering a representative
action, the court may, in its discretion, reconsider the availability of
the class suit when complications involving management, appropriate-
ness, or representation arise. 142
Prior to Ray, where the interrelationship among the class mem-
bers had consisted merely of common factual or legal issues, the courts
held the requisite common interest to be lacking.148 Furthermore,
although individual wrongs may have been committed by a common
plan, a class action would be unavailable if its utilization would sub-
ject the adverse party to defenses available against some members of
the class but not all.144 In Ray, the Court specifically abrogated this
requirement of common defenses. Noting that various defenses raise
complications involving management of class litigation, the Court felt
that any difficulties generated can be alleviated "by various procedural
141 CPLR 1005(b) provides:
The court at any stage of the action may impose such terms as shall fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the persons on whose behalf the action is
brought or defended. It may order that notice be given in a prescribed manner:
1. of a proposed settlement; or
2. of entry of a judgment.
142 35 N.Y.2d at 155, 316 N.E2d at 324-25, 359 N.YS.2d at 34-35. The protections
afforded by the Court in Ray can be found in rule 907 of proposed article nine which
provides:
In the conduct of class actions the court may make appropriate orders:
1. determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent
undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument;
2. requiring, for the protection of the members of the class, or otherwise for
the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, or to appear and
present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;
3. imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors;
4. requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allega-
tions as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed ac-
cordingly;5. directing that a money judgment favorable to the class be paid either in
one sum, whether forthwith or within such period as the court may fix, or in such
installments as the court may specify;
6. dealing with similar procedural matters.
The orders may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
TwtLrr ANNUAL RIsoRT, supra note 134, at 1802.
143 Separate wrongs to separate persons, though committed by similar means
and even pursuant to a single plan, do not alone create a common or general
interest in those who are wronged.
Society Milion Athena v. National Bank, 281 N.Y. 282, 292, 22 NE.2d 374, 377 (1939).
144 Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 129-30, 204 N.E2d 627, 631, 256 N.YS.2d
584, 589-90 (1965).
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devices as are now common in actions and proceedings embracing
many diverse claimants .... ,"145
Despite the expansive trend evidenced by Ray, the status of many
of the earlier restrictive notions regarding class action procedure re-
mains uncertain. If a court felt that a class suit would deprive the class
members of their choice of remedies or repudiate the only tie the class
has in common, a class action could not be maintained.1 46 Because the
Court in Ray, for the most part, leaves prior case law intact, the repre-
sentative device may still be limited to those instances where the relief
sought would satisfy the claims of all class members,147 or where the
object of the litigation is a limited common fund in which a ratable
distribution is to be made,148 or where the litigation arises out of trust,
partnership, or corporate ownership. 49
The Court in Ray bas apparently conformed much of the present
class action procedure to the liberal statutory provisions found in the
federal rule and proposed article nine. Thus, the decisional law of the
federal courts and jurisdictions with similar provisions could provide
adequate guidelines to the New York courts in future class litigation.
Nevertheless, the Court's affirmation of prior New York case law
engenders ambiguity since the extent of its continued viability was
not ascertained. Consequently, clarity in class action law will be con-
clusively established only by legislative adoption of article nine or
judicial abrogation of the restrictive concepts which have confined the
utilization of the class device.*
145 35 N.Y2d at 155, 316 NX.2d at 324, 359 N.Y.S2d at 34. Although the Court did
not specify which devices would be available, the device commonly utilized in multi-tort
litigation is a severance. CPLR 603 provides:
In furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice the court may order a sever-
ance of claims, or may order a separate trial of any claim, or of any separate
issue. The court may order the trial of any claim or issue prior to the trial of
the others.
146 In Onofrio v. Playboy Club, 15 N.Y.2d 740, 205 N.E.2d 308, 257 N.Y.S.2d 171
(1965), rev'g on dissenting opinion below 20 App. Div. 2d 3, 7-8, 244 N.Y.S.2d 485, 489-90
(1st Dep't 1963), a class action was brought to recover the membership fees which were
collected for the building of a private club but actually used for the construction of a
public restaurant. The class action was denied for two reasons. First, some members of
the class may not have consented to a dissolution of the enterprise in order to have the
funds dispersed; thus, allowing a class suit would deprive these members of their choice
of remedies. Second, the only common tie among the class consisted of the public restau-
rant formed by the members' contributions. A class suit to recover the contributions may
have necessitated the liquidation of the restaurant, thereby dissolving the only tie the
class had in common.
147 See, e.g., Kovarsky v. Brooldyn Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938).
148 See, e.g., Guffanti v. National Sur. Co., 196 N.Y. 452, 90 N.E. 174 (1909).
149 See Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 402, 259 NXE.2d 720, 722, 311 N.YS.2d
281, 284 (1970).
e Editor's Note. Prior to publication, the New York State Legislature passed proposed
article nine of the CPLR, thus repealing section 1005 and the law developed thereunder.
The bill, N.Y.S. 1309, N.Y.A. 1252, 198th Sess. (1975), codifying the liberal criteria outlined
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ARTICLE 0 - REMEDIES AND PLEADING
CPLR 3012(b): Retention of untimely complaint for 18 days held not
to constitute a waiver of right to move for dismissal.
CPLR 3012(b) provides that where the plaintiff elects to serve
only a summons, the defendant may properly demand a copy of the
complaint. Thereafter, failure of the plaintiff to serve the complaint
within 20 days of the demand can result in the dismissal of the
action. 15 0 Any such dismissal is discretionary with the court.15' In pass-
ing upon a CPLR 3012(b) dismissal motion, the court must consider
(1) the length of time of the delay, and (2) whether the motion for
dismissal was made prior or subsequent to the receipt of the late
complaint.152
In Johnson v. Johnson,153 the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, affirmed a ruling of the Supreme Court, Montgomery County,
which had granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pur-
suant to CPLR 3012(b).154 The action was based on an alleged breach
of a warranty deed, fraud, and deceit. No complaint was served with
the summons, and the defendants served a notice of appearance with
a demand for the complaint. Four months after defendants' demand,
plaintiff served the complaint. Defendants did not reject the com-
by the Court of Appeals in Ray, has been signed into law and will be effective Sept. 1,
1975. See N.Y. Times, June 19, 1975, at 42, col. 3.
150 CPLR 3012(b) provides:
If the complaint is not served with the summons, the defendant may serve a
written demand for the complaint. If the complaint is not served within twenty
days after service of the demand, the court upon motion may dismiss the action.
A demand or motion under this section does not of itself constitute an appear-
ance in the action.
Unlike CPA 257, CPLR 3012(b) does not require that service of the demand for the com-
plaint be made within 20 days of the service of the summons.
151 When the defendant makes a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3012(b), the
plaintiff, to prevent dismissal, must demonstrate to the court that there was a valid excuse
for the delay in serving the complaint and that he has a meritorious cause of action.
3 WK&M 8012.15.
In the exercise of its discretion, the court need not dismiss the action if the failure
to serve the complaint is unavoidable and no delay in prosecution has occurred. However,
an inadequate explanation of the delay will result in a dismissal of the action. Id. Com-
pare Ferrentino v. Farragut Gardens No. 5, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 815, 316 N.Y.S.2d 673
(2d Dep't 1970) (mem.) (dismissal granted where attorney allegedly misplaced plaintiff's
file and no meritorious claim was demonstrated), with McDonald v. King's Dep't Store,
Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 597, 275 N.Y.S.2d 707 (3d Dep't 1966) (per curiam) (dismissal denied
where attorney encountered research problems and defendant failed to show prejudice).
152 See generally 8 WK&M 8012.15. Although filing the motion to dismiss after
receiving the untimely complaint will not in and of itself require denial of the motion,
it has been suggested that the defendant's motion for dismissal will be muted, at least
psychologically, by such a delay. 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 8012, commentary at 590 (1974).
153 45 App. Div. 2d 899, 357 N.Y.S.2d 208 (3d Dep't 1974) (mem.).
154 Id. at 900, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 209. Plaintiff had sought by cross-motion to compel
defendants to accept the complaint. Id. at 899, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
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